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Summary
Emerging infectious animal and zoonotic diseases can inflict significant losses on 
animal production and public health, and threaten the safety and security of the food 
system. Threat analysis (forecasting), which monitors the measurable risk indicators 
of disease emergence, should be in place before the emergence of any threat. Animal 
and public health authorities develop and regularly re-evaluate disease preparedness, 
response and recovery plans, based on the ‘One Health’ principle. These plans should 
include surveillance, biosecurity measures, communication channels and training 
for personnel. Scenarios for outbreaks of natural emerging infectious disease or 
bioterrorist events should be prepared and practised. National and international 
legislation should be regularly updated to provide a robust legal basis to manage 
outbreaks. Reference laboratories should have reliable and validated diagnostic tools 
for rapid, high-throughput testing. Strict biosafety, biocontainment and biosecurity 
control measures must be implemented in laboratories in order to prevent the 
accidental or malicious release of pathogens. The pharmaceutical industry should 
be incentivised to develop vaccines and/or antiviral drugs against disease outbreaks. 
Conventions between public authorities and the pharmaceutical industry should 
guarantee adequate stockpiling of the pharmaceuticals needed to control large-scale 
outbreaks. 
In the early phase of disease emergence (early warning), veterinarians and stakeholders 
play an important role in early detection at the farm level. Upon notification, veterinary 
authorities must take rapid response measures to limit disease spread.
National and international short- and medium-term strategic research agendas should 
be developed, based on a comprehensive gap analysis and horizon scan. This planning 
will help to guide funding agencies and non-governmental organisations in their quest 
to support relevant research. 
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Introduction
Emerging infectious animal and zoonotic diseases may result 
in significant losses to the animal production and public 
health sectors and can threaten the safety and security of 
the food system. Governments and decision-makers are 
obliged to prepare for potential disease outbreaks, whether 
they result from natural, accidental (from laboratories), or 
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deliberate (bioterrorism) release. Adequate preparation for, 
early detection of and response to emerging diseases are 
ongoing concerns. 
Whether animal disease outbreaks are caused by natural 
events or an accidental or deliberate release, the mechanisms 
for disease detection, notification and control are similar. 
However, accidental and deliberate releases can differ from 
classic natural introductions. A deliberate release can carry 
special risks because pathogens may have been engineered 
for increased virulence or intentionally released into dense, 
vulnerable populations to maximise harm. In the case 
of a natural outbreak, depending on the virulence of the 
organism, the index case is usually unique and spread may 
occur gradually. This allows time for Veterinary Services 
to be alerted and take appropriate control measures. In 
the case of a deliberate (malicious) release, there is a high 
probability that the pathogen will be disseminated in several 
locations simultaneously. Veterinary and public health 
authorities must implement surveillance systems so that 
they can recognise patterns of non-specific syndromes that 
could indicate the early manifestation of a biological warfare 
attack (1). An increased response capacity and higher level 
of preparedness are therefore necessary in order to contain 
and control the spread of multiple simultaneous outbreaks 
from such a release (2).
Preparedness is the responsibility of all professionals 
involved in maintaining animal health and public health, 
and of those involved in ensuring the safety of the food chain. 
‘Preparedness’ is a broad term, encompassing research and 
the development of policies that ultimately result in tools, 
technology, education and training to support increased 
awareness, surveillance, traceability, early detection, 
response and recovery (3). Preparedness measures should 
be developed with a ‘One Health’ approach that involves 
both Veterinary and Health Services, laboratories and clinics, 
environmental experts, livestock farmers and other animal 
keepers, and last, but certainly not least, risk assessors and 
risk managers. 
In this article, the authors discuss emerging infectious 
animal and zoonotic disease preparedness in relation to 
the chronology of events that should occur before, during 
and after a disease emergence and/or outbreak (Fig. 1). 
Before disease emergence (anticipation), forecasting, risk 
assessment and risk management activities should be 
performed by risk assessors and risk managers. In the early 
phase of disease emergence, veterinarians, farmers and 
other stakeholders play an important role in early detection 
and notification. Prompt disease notification is crucial in 
controlling a disease outbreak and minimising its economic 
consequences. After a disease emerges, a robust response 
is needed in the form of control measures. Typically, this 
response is supported by the proper authorities, risk 
managers and epidemiologists, among others. 
Funding agencies, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and the veterinary research community also have 
an important role to play in preparing for infectious animal 
and zoonotic disease emergencies. Short- and medium-
term research priorities should be established within a 
robust process to identify the research requirements of a 
broad community of veterinary experts and stakeholders. 
This process should include the prioritisation of 
recommendations and needs, and a discussion of the 
appropriate policies required to support new technologies, 
tools and countermeasures. In short, a strategic research 
agenda should be developed, with clear priorities, 
milestones and funding.
Tools and methods that can be used for this purpose 
include: the Delphi expert solicitation (4), gap analysis and 
prioritisation (5), horizon scanning of the forces that drive 
animal disease emergence, scenario-building and foresight 
studies (6).
Preparing for emerging 
infectious animal and zoonotic 
disease outbreaks 
Active and passive animal disease surveillance focus on the 
(early) detection of diseases already present in the territory 
Fig. 1 
Chronological stages of preparedness in relation to disease emergence
Forecasting and planning/management measures are put in place before emergence (anticipation). Early-warning activities take place as the disease 
emerges (early reaction), and (reactive) control measures must be taken rapidly after disease emergence in order to limit the impact of the outbreak
Forecasting Planning and risk management Early warning Control measures
Emergence
Time
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or region concerned. These methods are based on clinical 
signs and diagnostic testing, systems that play a vital role 
in early detection but form only one component of an 
effective disease detection programme. Furthermore, they 
are unable to predict the next emerging infectious animal 
disease outbreak.
When preparing for emerging infectious animal and 
zoonotic disease outbreaks, forecasting the risk of disease 
incursions can be considered as the first anticipatory action. 
Further actions are described in the ‘Planning and risk 
management’ section, below.
Predicting the risk of disease incursions
Predicting disease incursions and outbreaks is a major 
challenge for veterinary and public health authorities. A better 
understanding of risk factors and their role in the likelihood 
that a new emerging animal or zoonotic disease will develop 
and threaten populations is needed. Understanding these 
risk factors is critical in accurately predicting a major disease 
outbreak or new disease emergence. Several studies have 
evaluated risk factors in disease emergence and these studies 
provide a comprehensive list of common drivers that lead to 
emerging diseases and outbreaks (i.e. 7, 8, 9, 10).
In recent advice (11), the Scientific Committee of the Belgian 
Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain noted that 
certain risk indicators of disease emergence are measurable 
and it is possible to monitor their evolution over time. 
The Committee recommended that veterinary authorities 
further develop methods to monitor risk indicators for 
disease emergence. Such indicators should be monitored 
closely for trends and threshold crossings, and provide 
automated alerts when an increased risk of animal disease 
introduction or spread occurs. Ideally, these systems will 
alert the veterinary and public health communities before a 
disease is introduced or an outbreak occurs or – at the very 
least – in the early stages of disease emergence.
As an example, the international status of animal diseases 
can be used as an early indicator. Periodic monitoring of 
this indicator is possible via such Web interfaces as the 
World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) alerts and 
the World Animal Health Information Database (WAHID), 
the European Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS) 
and the Programme for Monitoring Emerging Diseases 
(ProMED). When combined with a structured follow-up of 
imports and the trade of animals and animal products, via 
the European Trade Control and Expert System (TRACES), 
these databases provide valuable information to enable 
authorities to anticipate the risk of disease emergence in 
a specific country. However, in the case of a bioterrorist 
threat, special attention should be drawn to the illegal trade 
in animals and their products, Customs and border control, 
ports, etc. 
Threat analysis based on monitoring measurable risk 
indicators is a valuable first step in increasing the awareness 
of a potential disease outbreak.
Planning and risk management
Planning and risk management are early-phase components 
when preparing for a disease outbreak or emergence. This 
stage encompasses: 
– planning for disease prevention and control 
– ensuring laboratory readiness (i.e. training staff and 
validating diagnostic tests and biosafety) 
– developing and testing vaccines 
– coordinating of medical, veterinary, and ecological health 
systems and components
– ensuring that appropriate legislation is in place to support 
animal health authorities during a disease incursion. 
Prevention and control planning
Public authorities should develop strategic plans to combat 
emerging animal and zoonotic diseases. These plans should 
have clear objectives with regard to detection, surveillance 
and response; infrastructure; diagnostic tool development, 
validation and deployment; training; and prevention and 
control. These plans should also be founded on the One 
Health principle and should be promptly implemented 
as soon as a disease incursion is suspected. In addition, 
robust communication plans should be developed and 
put into practice when a suspected outbreak is confirmed. 
Good communication with producers and the public will 
help to minimise disease spread, enhance biosecurity and 
prevent panic. 
Preparations should make intensive use of multidisciplinary 
teams and collaboration, and result in strong partnerships 
between medical and veterinary professionals, 
epidemiologists, microbiologists, etc. All programmes 
aimed at controlling and eradicating emerging infectious 
diseases (EIDs) should be regularly re-evaluated. 
A strategic disease control plan should also take into account, 
forecast, and plan for the necessary human and financial 
resources to support all aspects of its implementation.
Preventive, predictive and reactive contingency plans, 
including simulation exercises, are necessary to enable the 
early implementation of control measures. Scenarios for a 
naturally occurring EID outbreak as well as for outbreaks 
caused by an intentional introduction should be prepared 
and practised. 
Livestock farmers should be educated on the need to practise 
strict biosecurity measures on a daily basis. The routine 
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implementation of these measures will ensure that, during 
times of an outbreak, these practices are already in place. 
The identification and registration of animals and animal 
products is crucial for monitoring movements and tracing 
disease outbreaks. Comprehensive and interconnected 
databases that include information such as animal 
identification, certification, movements, laboratory 
data, pathogen characteristics, epidemiological outbreak 
information, etc., should be established and maintained. 
The information in these databases, although confidential, 
should be easily accessible to animal health authorities in 
the event of an outbreak. 
The surveillance of domestic and wildlife animal species 
must be adequately organised in order to ensure early 
detection and, when appropriate, to demonstrate the 
absence of a disease. 
Notifications to the OIE and World Health Organization 
(WHO), and the exchange of information among countries 
are essential in the event of a transboundary and/or 
zoonotic disease outbreak. The Global Framework for the 
Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal Diseases 
(GF–TADs) was launched by the OIE and Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) 
in 2004 (12). In the event of a zoonotic disease, WHO is 
linked with GF–TADs through the Global Early Warning 
and Response System (GLEWS). GLEWS’ objective is 
to improve the early detection of health threats, and 
information on the events of significance to animal, human 
or ecosystem health is exchanged daily. WHO and FAO 
host and jointly manage a global network of national food 
safety authorities, the International Food Safety Authorities 
Network (INFOSAN), which alerts National Focal Points 
when there is regional or global concern over a food safety 
event.
International coordination and cooperation are indicated 
when a disease has the potential for rapid, general spread 
across national boundaries and large regions. Coordination 
between public and animal health services or the ‘One 
Health principle’ should be applied, especially in the case 
of a zoonotic emerging disease. 
Legislation and guidelines 
There are general and specific global agreements, guidelines 
and resolutions, requirements and recommendations for 
preparing for and responding to a disease event. In addition, 
the European Union (EU) member States and many other 
countries each have their own policies, legislation and 
regulations related to disease preparedness, response and 
recovery. Legislation to support disease response should be 
kept up to date and should legally support risk managers as 
they take the necessary action to protect animal and public 
health. 
On the international level, resolutions and recommendations 
have been agreed upon among the OIE Member Countries. 
These countries are legally bound to report outbreaks of 
OIE-listed diseases and emerging diseases quickly and 
with transparency through the online World Animal 
Health Information System (WAHIS). Once validated, this 
information is rapidly disseminated through the WAHID 
system. Timely sharing of disease information enables a 
rapid and effective international response and may prevent 
the future spread of diseases. Health measures are described 
in the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code and Aquatic Animal 
Health Code (13, 14) after being formally adopted by 
Member Countries at the annual General Assembly. 
Laboratory preparedness
Early detection is the single most important aspect of 
minimising production losses as well as reducing the 
spread and cost of a disease outbreak (15). Syndromic 
and laboratory surveillance play a critical role in the early 
detection and characterisation of an outbreak. Except for 
truly novel diseases, diagnostic tests are described for most 
exotic and emerging diseases in the OIE Manual of Diagnostic 
Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals (Terrestrial Manual) 
and the Manual of Diagnostic Tests for Aquatic Animals 
(Aquatic Manual) (16, 17). Laboratories should carry out 
these tests based on a list of priorities, which should be 
regularly reviewed, depending on the risk assessments 
performed for their country.
If these tests are not carried out within the country, then 
the national laboratory responsible should have a firm 
agreement with an OIE or FAO Reference Laboratory, 
guaranteeing diagnostic capability in the event of an 
outbreak in the country concerned. Full validation (16, 17) 
of these tests can be difficult as representative positive field 
samples are hard to obtain in countries where the disease is 
not endemic or occurs sporadically. This can make it difficult 
to get an accurate measurement of test sensitivity within the 
desired population. In many cases, when positive samples 
are not available, the laboratory can gain confidence in its 
performance of the test by requesting reference samples 
from the network of international reference laboratories. 
The laboratory can then obtain the specificity of the test, 
using samples from its own negative population.
It is crucial to understand the test performance and 
percentage of false positives and false negatives before a 
disease introduction. Decisions on animal health status 
and movement are often made using these test results, 
so it is vital for the decision-maker to understand the 
performance of the test in the animal population that is 
being tested. For antibody detection tests, it is important 
to understand the capability of the assay Differentiating 
Infected from Vaccinated Animals (DIVA), especially if the 
animal population is vaccinated, in which case, samples 
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Laboratory biosafety and biosecurity
Many pathogens that are handled in veterinary laboratories 
are dangerous to both human and animal health. Effective, 
risk-based biosafety measures are essential to protect the 
safety of personnel who may be exposed to such agents. 
The OIE Terrestrial Manual (Chapter 1.1.4.) (16) provides 
biosafety guidelines for veterinary laboratories and animal 
facilities. For pathogens such as FMDV, special guidelines 
have been developed by the European Commission (EC). 
Reference to these guidelines is made in the EC Directive 
on foot and mouth disease (FMD), making them obligatory 
in the EU (27). Effective biocontainment and biosecurity 
should prevent the release of pathogens from the laboratory 
and further prevent their malicious use by terrorists or 
as bio-weapons. Four biocontainment levels have been 
defined by the OIE, based on the risk to animal health and 
public health.
Ideally, all public, private and university laboratories should 
install and maintain the required biocontainment level to 
handle specific pathogens. However, not all countries have 
the resources to build and maintain a P3 or P4 laboratory. 
Moreover, many of these pathogens are endemic in those 
countries. 
Vaccines and antivirals: collaboration with industry
Close collaboration between national and/or international 
authorities and pharmaceutical companies is required when 
a newly developed vaccine is needed to control an EID. 
However, the development and production of a vaccine is 
a reactive process if the emerging pathogen was previously 
unknown. In that case, a quick procedure for vaccine 
development, licensing and marketing authorisation is 
needed. A perfect example of this type of response was 
provided by the introduction of Schmallenberg virus into 
Europe. Conventional inactivated vaccines against the 
virus were quickly released onto the market. This was 
facilitated by a rapid industrial development process and an 
expedited procedure for obtaining a temporary marketing 
authorisation from the European Medicines Agency (EMA). 
The same approach was followed for BTV serotype 8 vaccines 
although, in this case, the virus was already known and the 
industry was able to transfer its technology from previous 
BT serotypes to prepare a new vaccine that addressed BTV 
serotype 8 (28).
Indeed, in the case of known pathogens, and based on an 
analysis of the risk of emergence, the availability of vaccines 
can be anticipated through the following approaches:
i) Antigen and vaccine banks can be created, as the EU did 
for FMDV vaccines, in collaboration with pharmaceutical 
companies (29).
from a non-vaccinated population should be obtained. If 
a DIVA test is available to differentiate the infected from 
the vaccinated animals (18), a determination of specificity 
using samples from a vaccinated population (19) should be 
part of the validation process and included in the validation 
dossier.
The availability of rapid or pen-side tests, such as lateral 
flow devices (20) for antibody or antigen detection, means 
that these tests can be performed in the field or laboratory 
to triage samples. However, it is critical that these tests are 
validated and fit for purpose. If the test is to be used in a 
field setting, validation and training should be carried out in 
that setting. Training in the performance and interpretation 
of these assays requires a pre-established decision tree to 
guide the response to a positive or negative test result. 
Once a new EID is detected in a country, the number of 
samples to be analysed can increase exponentially. As part 
of laboratory preparedness, advance agreements should 
be made to allow for the movement of samples from the 
outbreak area to other laboratories for testing. This will 
help to ensure increased capacity in the event of a large-
scale outbreak. The establishment of a network of regional 
laboratories within the country is also very useful. The 
latter requires the organisation of training and proficiency 
tests to ensure a well-prepared network (21). However, the 
need for a regional network of laboratories is not always 
considered a priority during ‘peace time’.
One of the responsibilities of laboratories for exotic and 
emerging diseases is to follow the evolution and spread of 
these diseases on the international level. In this respect, 
the spread of lumpy skin disease from Africa, which began 
in 2012 via the Middle East to Turkey in 2013 (22), and 
continued on to Cyprus in 2014 and Greece in 2015, 
should have been a very clear signal for other European 
laboratories to prepare their diagnostic capability for 
this disease. However, the evolution of these diseases is 
not always predictable, as illustrated by an unexpected 
epidemic of West Nile virus, which began in New York 
in 1999 (23); the detection of foot and mouth disease 
virus (FMDV) in 2001 in the United Kingdom (24); the 
still-unexplained appearance of bluetongue virus (BTV), 
serotype 8, in north-western Europe in 2006 (25); and 
the introduction of African swine fever virus into Georgia 
in 2007 (26). Although the diagnostic techniques needed 
for these diseases could be implemented quite quickly, 
as the basic technologies required, such as enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay, virus isolation or reverse-
transcription polymerase chain reaction, are standard 
practices at most laboratories, it is far better to be prepared 
and to have a working capability, as well as reagents for 
these diseases, prior to their introduction. 
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ii) ‘Mock-up’ vaccines can be created. This procedure, 
accepted by EMA for human pandemic influenza vaccines, 
involves the development of a vaccine that is identical 
in composition and in the manufacturing process to the 
‘eventual’ pandemic vaccine (30). It contains a viral strain 
that can quickly be adapted by the insertion of pandemic 
strain antigen sequences. There is no known example in 
veterinary medicine thus far.
iii) The vaccine strain can be adapted by incorporating strains 
that are antigenically similar to the circulating viruses. The 
only example of this in veterinary medicine thus far is the 
recommendation of the OIE Expert Surveillance Panel 
on Equine Influenza Vaccine Composition that strains be 
selected for equine influenza in accordance with the current 
epidemiological situation (31). 
Antivirals are still under development in veterinary 
medicine. In the case of FMD and classical swine fever, the 
use of antiviral drugs has been discussed as an alternative 
to vaccination or a supplementary method to be used in 
previously virus-free countries or zones. The use of such 
antiviral treatments in a vaccinated zone could protect 
against viral dissemination and bridge the time gap 
between vaccination and the development of protective 
immunity. This approach is now theoretically envisaged 
as an alternative or complement to emergency vaccination 
(32, 33). 
Strong and coordinated health systems (One Health)
When a zoonotic disease occurs, whether naturally or 
through the deliberate or accidental introduction of a disease 
agent, coordination of the animal health and public health 
response is essential, at both the national and international 
levels. In the case of diseases affecting wildlife, coordination 
with those authorities responsible for wildlife surveillance 
will be necessary. When there is suspicion of deliberate 
release, collaboration with law enforcement agencies is an 
important part of the response. To reduce biothreats, a focus 
on strengthening, enhancing and developing cross-links 
between existing health systems is of primary importance. 
Coordination between existing structures must be planned 
and prepared well in advance of a natural or intentional 
outbreak. 
Early warning
Surveillance and early detection
A major aspect of preparedness for emerging animal and 
zoonotic diseases is the development and implementation 
of robust surveillance systems that allow the early detection 
of disease. The most effective and sustainable way to 
protect against threats from deliberate and accidental 
releases of animal pathogens is to strengthen existing 
systems for surveillance and early on-farm detection. We 
need surveillance networks that include a key role for the 
farmer/producer and veterinary practitioner. The farmer 
and veterinarian are often the first to observe a sick animal 
and thus are key components in any effective surveillance 
system. In addition, the veterinary practitioner has an 
obligation to notify the proper animal health authority of 
a suspect notifiable disease. The relationship between the 
farmer and veterinary practitioner is based on trust and 
cooperation. 
Disease reporting and notification 
General or specific agreements, requirements, guidelines 
and/or recommendations for reporting a disease event 
exist on the global level. In addition, EU member States 
and many other countries also have their own legislation 
and regulations that specify lists of notifiable diseases and/
or methods of reporting a suspected animal disease event, 
whether emerging or zoonotic. 
In the EU, Council Directive 82/894/EEC and Commission 
Implementing Decision 2012/737/EU set out the 
requirements for the notification of animal diseases within 
the Union and the development and use of the Animal 
Disease Notification System for direct notifications (34, 35).
Member Countries of the OIE have committed themselves 
to providing all necessary information to achieve control 
of emerging diseases and minimise their spread. The 
transparent notification of diseases and epidemiological 
information is outlined in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code 
and the Aquatic Animal Health Code (13, 14). Information 
should be transmitted to the OIE by OIE Member Countries 
through direct notification, with follow-up reports and six-
monthly or annual reports. 
Under the International Health Regulations (2005) (36), 
binding 194 countries across the globe, all cases of the 
following four diseases must be automatically notified to 
WHO: smallpox, poliomyelitis due to wild-type poliovirus, 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and cases of 
human influenza caused by a new subtype. 
Control measures
Many countries have a defined list of control measures 
and guidelines that must be applied in the event of an EID 
outbreak. A few of these measures/guidelines are: 
– mandatory notification of suspected cases or outbreaks 
– official surveillance of suspected/infected holdings, with 
periodic veterinary checks and regular inspections 
– carrying-out of epidemiological surveys 
– the imposing of disease control and biosecurity measures, 
depending on the animal health and epidemiological 
situation 
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– emergency slaughter of animals or the implementation of 
a test-and-slaughter strategy 
– the imposition of a stamping-out policy 
– specific measures for processing the carcasses of dead or 
euthanased animals and animal by-products 
– the disposal or recycling of animal carcasses and waste 
– the regionalisation or delimitation of restricted zones, in 
which special conditions are applied to the movement of or 
trade in certain animals and animal products 
– the installation of temporary controls in a protection 
zone of 3 km around an outbreak, and a surveillance zone 
of 10 km 
– monitoring the movements of animals 
– a restriction or total ban on the movement of animals, 
people and vehicles into or out of a holding under 
surveillance 
– the establishment of requirements and/or conditions for 
allowing animals and/or animal products on the market, for 
trade and import 
– implementing strict biosecurity standards
– ensuring the appropriate cleansing and disinfection of 
vehicles, equipment, and other items moving on and off 
affected premises 
– imposing preventive control measures on in-contact 
herds, slaughterhouses, border inspection posts, 
transportation vehicles, and for the transport and 
distribution of animal manure from susceptible species 
– the establishment of sanitary measures for feed, forage, 
hay and straw 
– performing clinical exams and serological surveys to 
determine disease status within a holding, region or country 
– developing legal provisions for effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive penalties applicable to infringements of 
mandatory measures 
– implementing an emergency protective or suppressive 
vaccination policy 
– establishing requirements and conditions for restocking 
affected premises (e.g. the use of sentinel animals). 
The EU has specific legislation for a number of animal 
diseases, depending on their social and economic impact. 
This legislation covers notification obligations, diagnostic 
methods, and measures to be applied when the disease is 
suspected or confirmed, as well as – where applicable – 
regionalisation measures.
Research needs for emerging 
infectious animal diseases
Research on the prevention and control of endemic diseases 
is often carried out at the national level. Research into 
EIDs, animal and zoonotic, sometimes takes place at the 
global level. 
There are comprehensive needs for research on emerging 
and zoonotic diseases, and international cooperation 
and coordination of research programmes are highly 
indicated. In the past, networks have been set up across 
Europe among research fund providers, including the 
Coordination of European Research on Emerging and Major 
Infectious Diseases of Livestock (EMIDA ERA–Net) and the 
Coordination of European Research on Animal Health and 
Welfare (ANIHWA ERA–Net). Both of these databases have 
since been incorporated into a single resource (www.scar-
cwg-ahw.org).
At the international level, there is the Global Strategic 
Alliances for the Coordination of Research on the Major 
Infectious Diseases of Animals and Zoonoses network 
(STAR-IDAZ) (www.star-idaz.net). STAR-IDAZ has been 
conducting foresight studies as part of an objective to 
improve the prioritisation and coordination of research into 
the major infectious diseases of animals, including zoonoses. 
It is hoped that enhanced coordination and prioritisation 
will speed up the delivery of improved countermeasures. 
The goal of these foresight studies was to identify scientific 
and technological needs, research capacity and support 
structures to leverage and enhance research programmes 
so that they could more effectively deliver technologies 
and tools to prevent, control or mitigate animal health and 
zoonotic challenges to 2030 and beyond.
The STAR-IDAZ International Research Consortium 
includes organisations and NGOs that fund and perform 
research in Europe, Asia, Australia, the Americas, Africa 
and the Middle East. Other international organisations and 
veterinary pharmaceutical companies are also included. 
Together, they have set a total budget in the region of 
US$ 2.5 billion to invest in animal health research over a five-
year period from 2016–2021. Partners of the consortium 
have agreed to coordinate their research programmes to 
address agreed-upon needs, share their results, and together 
deliver new and improved animal health strategies for at 
least 30 priority diseases, infections and issues. This work 
focuses on developing candidate vaccines, diagnostics, 
therapeutics and other animal health products, procedures 
and/or key scientific information and tools to support risk 
analysis and disease control. 
Priority topics for collaboration have been identified. They 
are categorised by discipline (immunology, vaccinology 
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Préparation et besoins en recherche dans le domaine des maladies 
animales infectieuses émergentes et des zoonoses
S. Cardoen, K. De Clercq, L. Vanholme, P. De Winter, E. Thiry  
& X. Van Huffel
Résumé
Les maladies animales infectieuses et les zoonoses émergentes ont un coût élevé 
pour la santé animale et la santé publique, en plus d’entraîner d’importantes 
pertes de production dans les élevages et de menacer la sécurité des systèmes 
and diagnostics, epidemiology and foresight, animal health 
genomics) and disease (influenza, bovine tuberculosis, 
foot and mouth disease, brucellosis, African swine fever, 
rabies, respiratory diseases of pigs, vector-borne diseases, 
coronaviruses, parasitic diseases, mastitis and foodborne 
pathogens). Another important area is antimicrobial 
resistance and the development of alternatives to 
antimicrobial agents.
Identifying and prioritising research needs for animal 
diseases is an important step which has also been tackled 
by the EU Seventh Framework Programme’s Disease 
Control Tools (DISCONTOOLS) project (5) for some 50 
diseases. This project is still ongoing, with private funding. 
A gap analysis for each of the prioritised diseases is being 
further developed to identify research needs in the areas of 
diagnostics, vaccines and pharmaceuticals.
Current initiatives for international collaboration on research 
into EIDs and zoonotic diseases are being undertaken in the 
framework of the HORIZON 2020 European Research and 
Innovation programme (https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/
horizon2020). 
On the national level, research programmes focused on 
EIDs and zoonotic diseases are often developed on the basis 
of specific short- and medium-term needs and take into 
consideration specific local situations and research capacity. 
In Belgium, the Risk-Based Increase of Diagnostic Capacities 
for Epizootic Diseases in Belgium (EPIDIACAP) project 
(www.coda-cerva.be/index.php?option=com_content& 
view=article&id=560&lang=fr) is aimed at defining the 
research needs of epizootic disease diagnostics. The main 
objectives of this project are to identify diagnostic gaps in 
order to optimise the mass detection of epizootic diseases 
which pose the greatest threat of introduction and to 
expand this diagnostic capacity through a sound selection 
of tests for development or optimisation.
According to Christopher (37), veterinary research in the 
next decade must strengthen the scientific impact of its core 
mission in animal health while firmly reinforcing its societal 
and global relevance. Key research challenges include water- 
and food-borne pathogens and drug residues, zoonotic 
pathogens and infectious diseases, and evidence-based 
companion animal medicine and its potential applications to 
human health. Meeting these challenges will require cross-
disciplinary global collaboration, significant investment in 
national research, and online publishing tools to facilitate 
networking and open scientific exchange.
Conclusion
How to predict the unpredictable, the next emerging 
infectious animal disease, zoonosis or emerging biological 
threat? Veterinary and medical services, authorities and 
laboratories should prepare themselves for emergent 
disease outbreaks. The best way to be prepared is to study 
and evaluate the threats (forecasting), to enhance awareness 
and training for professionals in the animal sector (through 
syndromic surveillance and early warning), and to keep 
veterinary and medical diagnostic and response capacity at 
a high level. This will require proactive and constructive 
collaboration and information exchange between all 
involved stakeholders: farmers, professionals working in 
the field, regional and national laboratories, veterinary and 
medical authorities, pharmaceutical companies and the 
research community. 
Preparedness against an unknown EID poses a true 
challenge for risk managers and veterinary authorities. 
New tools are now available, including refined laboratory 
techniques for diagnostics and medicinal products, as 
well as biostatistics and epidemiological computer models 
for determining spread. The next crucial step should be 
focusing on evaluating, monitoring, alerting and responding 
to the measurable drivers of disease emergence.
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Preparación y necesidades de la investigación sobre las 
enfermedades animales infecciosas emergentes y las zoonosis
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Resumen
Las enfermedades animales infecciosas y las zoonosis emergentes pueden causar 
pérdidas cuantiosas en los ámbitos de la producción animal y la salud pública, 
además de amenazar la higiene y la seguridad de los sistemas alimentarios. El 
análisis (pronóstico) de amenazas, que consiste en seguir de cerca indicadores 
cuantificables del riesgo de aparición de enfermedades animales, es algo que 
debería estar implantado antes de que surja toda amenaza. Las autoridades 
sanitarias y zoosanitarias definen y periódicamente reevalúan planes de 
preparación, respuesta y recuperación frente a enfermedades, basándose para ello 
en el principio de «Una sola salud». Estos planes deben incluir labores de vigilancia 
y medidas de seguridad biológica, además de prever cauces de comunicación 
y actividades de formación del personal. También hay que elaborar y aplicar 
de production alimentaire. Une analyse des menaces (anticipation), grâce au suivi 
d’indicateurs mesurables du risque d’émergence des maladies animales, devrait 
être en place avant que ces menaces n’émergent. Les autorités en charge de la 
santé animale et de la santé publique développent et réévaluent régulièrement des 
plans de préparation, de réponse et de récupération vis-à-vis de maladies, sur la 
base du principe « Une seule santé ». Ces plans doivent inclure des mesures de 
surveillance et de biosécurité, en plus de se doter de moyens de communication 
et de formation du personnel. Il convient d’élaborer et de mettre en pratique des 
scénarios d’émergence de maladies infectieuses, que celle-ci soit d’origine naturelle 
ou d’origine bioterroriste. Les législations nationales et internationales en la matière 
doivent être actualisées régulièrement afin de fournir un fondement juridique solide 
à la gestion des émergences. Les laboratoires de référence doivent disposer 
d’outils diagnostiques fiables et validés permettant la réalisation de tests rapides et 
à haut débit. Des mesures strictes de contrôle de la biosécurité, du bioconfinement 
et de la biosûreté doivent être appliquées dans les laboratoires pour prévenir 
toute libération accidentelle ou malintentionnée d’agents pathogènes. L’industrie 
pharmaceutique doit être incitée au développement de vaccins et d’antiviraux pour 
maîtriser les maladies émergentes. Les conventions entre les autorités publiques et 
l’industrie pharmaceutique doivent permettre de garantir la constitution de stocks 
suffisants de produits pharmaceutiques pour maîtriser les émergences de grande 
ampleur. 
Lors des premières phases d’émergence d’un foyer (alerte précoce), les vétérinaires 
et autres acteurs de terrain jouent un rôle important dans la détection précoce au 
niveau des élevages. Dès la notification d’un foyer, les autorités vétérinaires doivent 
réagir rapidement afin d’en limiter la propagation.
Il convient de développer des programmes nationaux et internationaux de recherche 
stratégique à court et moyen terme, basés sur un examen exhaustif des lacunes 
et sur une analyse prospective complète. Cette planification contribuera à fournir 
aux agences de financement et aux organisations non gouvernementales des 
orientations leur permettant de déterminer quel soutien apporter à la recherche.  
Mots-clés
Émergence accidentelle – Émergence naturelle – Introduction délibérée – Maladie animale 
émergente – Préparation – Recherche – Zoonose.
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planes para hipotéticos brotes infecciosos, ya sean de origen natural u obra de 
bioterroristas. Asimismo, a fin de contar con sólidas bases jurídicas para combatir 
la aparición de enfermedades, es preciso actualizar periódicamente la legislación 
nacional e internacional. Los laboratorios de referencia deben contar con 
herramientas de diagnóstico fiables y validadas que permitan efectuar pruebas 
rápidas y de alto rendimiento. Es preciso implantar en los laboratorios estrictas 
medidas de control de la protección, la contención y la seguridad biológicas 
para evitar toda liberación accidental o malintencionada de patógenos. Hay que 
incentivar asimismo a la industria farmacéutica para que desarrolle vacunas 
y fármacos antivirales contra las enfermedades emergentes. Por otra parte, las 
autoridades públicas deben suscribir con el sector farmacéutico convenios que 
garanticen la constitución de reservas suficientes de los productos farmacéuticos 
requeridos para hacer frente a la aparición de brotes de grandes dimensiones. 
En las primeras fases de la aparición de un foco (alerta rápida), los veterinarios 
y otros interlocutores cumplen una importante función para detectar con prontitud 
la patología dentro de las explotaciones. Al recibir notificación, las autoridades 
veterinarias deben reaccionar con rapidez para poner coto a la propagación de 
la enfermedad.
Por último, a partir de un análisis exhaustivo de las carencias existentes y de 
un estudio prospectivo completo, es preciso elaborar planes nacionales e 
internacionales de investigación estratégica a corto y medio plazo. Tal planificación 
ayudará a orientar a los organismos de financiación y las organizaciones no 
gubernamentales (ONG) en su labor de apoyo a las investigaciones de interés. 
Palabras clave
Aparición accidental – Aparición natural – Enfermedad animal emergente – Enfermedad 
zoonótica – Introducción deliberada – Investigación – Preparación.
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